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Continuum in the 1980s
John C. Berg
Studies in the 1960s determined that Massachusetts had strong parties and weak interest
groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the Republican Party shrank, party competition
declined, conflict with the Democratic Party grew, and interest groups gained more
importance— and probably will remain important despite the Republican gains of
1990. However, group conflict and citizen mobilization, including increased use of the
initiative and referendum, create a situation of interest-centered conflict rather than
interest-group dominance as traditionally conceived. This article, based on a 1987
survey ofstate legislators and legislative aides, plus a summary of recent Massachusetts
political history, assesses the relative importance of various types ofgroups and ofpartic-
ular organizations.
Studies of state interest-group politics by V. O. Key, Jr., Sarah McCally More-
house, and others posit an inverse relationship between the strength of groups
and the strength of political parties. 1 In one sense, such a relationship is logically
necessary; if parties dominate politics, groups cannot, and vice versa. Morehouse
rightly distinguishes between states in which groups can act only through the parties
and those in which powerful groups can ignore the parties, offering the domination
of Alabama by the Farm Bureau as a classic example of the latter. 2 Studies of Mas-
sachusetts interest groups in the 1950s and 1960s accepted this relationship and clas-
sified the state as having a strong two-party system with weak groups. 3 However, the
most recent of these studies was published in 1969; Morehouse's later book simply
reports the conclusions of the earlier studies.
Great changes in the last two decades have moved Massachusetts closer to the
interest-group end of the interest-group/political-party dominance scale. However,
I believe that movement along this scale does not convey the whole picture. While
the interest groups are now much stronger than the parties, they do not dominate
Massachusetts politics. They are kept from doing so not by the parties, but by inter-
group conflict.
The most dramatic change in Massachusetts politics has been the rise in Demo-
cratic Party dominance of the legislature. The Democrats won control of both
houses for the first time ever in 1958 and have not lost it since. In the 1976 election,
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Republican numbers in the state Senate dropped below the level needed (8 mem-
bers) to force a roll call vote and continued to hover just above or below this line
until 1990.
4 During the 1980s the Republicans failed to contest most seats. If every
Republican candidate in the 1986 election had won (and only 58 percent of them
did), the Democrats would still have retained control of both houses by virtue of the
114 uncontested seats. (See Table 1 for a summary of this election for the House.)
Table 1
Party Competition in Massachusetts Legislative









Democrat 23 11 92 126
Republican 14 3 16 33
Independent 1 — — 1
Source: Calculated from Massachusetts Election Statistics, 1986, sec. 133 , 198-357.
Although Ronald Reagan carried the state in both 1980 and 1984, Republicans
did not win any statewide or federal elected office between the election of Senator
Edward Brooke in 1972 and that of Governor William Weld, Lieutenant Governor
Paul Cellucci, and Treasurer Joseph Malone in 1990. During that time the question
often was not whether the Republicans would win, but whether they would manage
to field candidates. In 1986, the first two Republican candidates for governor with-
drew from the ballot in the face of scandal and the Republicans failed to contest 7 of
the 10 Democratic seats in the U.S. House of Representatives, 6 of the 8 seats in the
all-Democratic Executive Council, 22 of the 29 Democratic seats in the state Senate,
and 103 of the 126 Democratic seats in the House of Representatives. 5
As might be expected, one result of the two decades of Democratic prosperity
was the loss of whatever internal coherence the party might have had. Massachusetts
developed an electoral pattern similar to that of the one-party South. In both the
state legislature and the U.S. House of Representatives, the renomination of incum-
bents was rarely challenged; but when a vacancy occurred, there was a mad primary
scramble among as many as six candidates. The primary winner— often with far
less than a majority of the vote— then faced only token or no opposition from the
Republicans and was generally able to retain the seat for as long as he or she chose.
(A similar pattern prevailed among the Republicans in the few strongholds they
retained through the 1980s.) 6 The preprimary endorsement conventions for state-
wide offices do little to strengthen the parties, since any candidate who gets as
much as 15 percent of the delegate vote can and does go on to the primary.
Things changed dramatically in 1990. Taking advantage of a state budget crisis,
the Republicans won the elections for governor, lieutenant governor, and state trea-
surer. Led by its aggressive chairman, Ray Shamie, the Republican State Commit-
tee increased its paid staff to 28 and recruited legislative candidates energetically.
Republicans contested 37 of the 40 state Senate seats and won 16, doubling their
strength in that body. Having won 38 House seats, they seem determined to bring
62
two-party competition back to Massachusetts.
7 However, the Democrats continue
to dominate the state legislature, hold all 11 (soon to be reduced) seats in the U.S.
House and both U.S. Senate seats, and tend to dismiss the 1990 Republican victories
as a fluke. Republicans John Volpe and Francis Sargent held the governor's office
from 1967 to 1974 without seriously threatening Democratic dominance of the state,
and many Democratic legislators hope that Weld's term will meet the same fate.
Events may prove them wrong; but so far the Republican gains have had little effect
on the modus operandi of the Democratic Party policymakers.
Individual Democratic politicians may have strong organizations, but these are
purely personal. Such organizations work hard for their leader but have little or
no effect on nominations for other offices. This is especially true in the downward
direction: a local official may call on his or her troops to work for a gubernatorial
candidate, but any attempt by a governor to influence the outcome of a local pri-
mary contest is likely to be deeply resented and counterproductive. Thus Gover-
nor Michael Dukakis, who possessed one of the strongest personal organizations
of any Massachusetts politician, chose to stay out of contests for lieutenant gover-
nor in 1982 and 1986, even though he subsequently had to run on a joint ticket
with the victor.
Although the absence of a strong Democratic Party organization might lead to a
chaotic legislature, it does not, because power in the General Court is highly central-
ized in the hands of the Senate president and the House speaker. The two presiding
officers are chosen by majority vote of the members of their respective chambers,
but once elected, each possesses a multitude of resources for consolidating his (or
potentially, her) power. Unlike the U.S. Congress, the Massachusetts General Court
has no seniority system. Committee memberships and chairmanships, office space,
furniture, additional staff support beyond the one aide to which each member is
entitled, patronage jobs in the State House, and even parking space in the state
garages are all under the control of the presiding officers. Legislative leaders also
control significant patronage in the state's executive branch, because another of the
peculiarities of the state's constitution permits the legislature to define the terms of
office — including terms for life — of all executive officials other than judges and
elected constitutional officers. The legislature generally must both authorize posi-
tions and permit them to be filled. 8 Until 1967, governors often were unable to
choose their own major department heads. 9
The privileges and positions of legislators can be conferred or withdrawn by the
leadership at any time. Moreover, many top positions carry salary increments, so
that members' pocketbooks as well as their power depend on the leaders' will.
Those who wield this power too strongly risk being deposed by the membership,
as in 1985, when Speaker Thomas McGee was ousted by George Keverian. But
challenges to sitting leaders are rare, so they have a good deal of leeway in leg-
islative matters.
Since the Democrats held both the governorship and the two legislative leader-
ship positions from 1975 to 1991, strong party coordination of policy might have
been possible. But in practice, the Democrats' numerical strength was so great that
much of the pressure for unity was removed, and disputes among the three powerful
Democrats were brought center stage. While the capture of the governor's office by
Republican Weld has created more pressure for Democratic unity, Senate president
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William Bulger and House speaker Charles Flaherty have not always succeeded in
overcoming the centrifugal tendencies of the 1980s.
In a study published in 1981, Doyle and Milburn found that
because of the fluid party organizational structures within most of the New Eng-
land states, the general influence on governmental policy in all six states comes
from organized interests. Factions appear within the parties of the legislatures
and from one gubernatorial officer (often of the same party) to another. 10
One might question whether the divisions within the party today constitute "factions,"
but the incoherence of the Democratic Party on policy questions remains. The way is
clear for the influence of interest groups.
The Current Interest-Group Scene
To discover what legislators and legislative staff thought about various interest
groups, I drew up a survey and sent forms to every member of the legislature in the
fall of 1987. 1 asked the members to fill out one copy themselves and give another
one to a staff aide. I received replies from 42 of the 200 legislators and from 36 staff
members. This response rate is not high enough to show significant patterns through
statistical analysis. Nevertheless, the responses were suggestive in some areas. While
it is possible that some important groups were not mentioned by the respondents,
we can fairly conclude that any group that was mentioned frequently has some
importance. The survey form requested information about the activity and influence
of six types of interest groups: business groups, professional groups, labor, grassroots
community groups, religious groups, and women's groups. Respondents were asked
about the activity and influence of each category of group, then asked to identify the
particular groups in each category they thought were most important.
Respondents were also asked to rate the seven types of groups separately by three
different criteria: how often they heard from each type; how likely their own vote (or
their boss's, in the case of aides) was to be influenced by that type of group; and how
much influence that type of group had on the outcome of legislation. The responses
were averaged, and interest-group types ranked, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Composite Rankings of Interest-Group Influence
Frequency of Influence on Influence on
Type of Contact Persona I Vote Outcome of Leelislation
Group Legislator Aide Legislator Aide Legislator Aideftie!
Labor 4 5 3 6 1 1/2
Business 2 1 5 5 2 1/2
Environmentalist 1 3 1 2 3 5
Grassroots citizens 3 2 2 1 4 3
Professional 5 4 6 3 5 4
Women's 6 6 4 4 6 6
Religious 7 7 7 7 7 7
Source: Calculated from my survey, November-December 1987.
These figures show a certain amount of cynicism on the part of the respondents;
while their own votes are most influenced by environmentalist and grassroots citi-
zens groups, they perceive business and labor as having the most influence on leg-
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islative decisions. Similarly, respondents see themselves as more responsive than the
legislature as a whole to women's groups. This may show that the sample is unrepre-
sentative; proportionately more women than men responded. (Twelve female and 26
male legislators filled out questionnaires; in 1987, 37 of the 200 members were
female.) But it may also represent a recognition of what one respondent wrote on
the questionnaire: "Most high-powered lobby efforts are really geared toward the
House speaker, Senate president, and a few key committee chairmen because the
rank and file legislators rarely vote against what these people say."
Table 3 shows the specific groups most often mentioned by both legislators and
staff members in response to a request to list by name "the most powerful [groups]
in Massachusetts."
Table 3
Legislative and Staff Mentions of the Most
Powerful Groups in Massachusetts
Group Legislator Staff
Associated Industries of Massachusetts 12 7
Citizens for Limited Taxation 12 7
Insurance industry 11 6
Massachusetts Teachers Association 12 7
AFL-CIO 8 5
Massachusetts Hospital Association 6 6
Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts 6 3
Massachusetts Bar Association 5 3
Massachusetts High Tech Council 4 2
Massachusetts Municipal Association 7 3
Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group 4 5
Gun Owners Action League 4 2
League of Women Voters 1 3
Chamber of Commerce 3
Massachusetts Medical Society 1 4
Source: Calculated from my survey, November-December 1987.
Those mentioned most frequently include business (Associated Industries of
Massachusetts), local government (Massachusetts Municipal Association), labor
(AFL-CIO, Massachusetts Teachers Association, Professional Firefighters of Mas-
sachusetts), and citizens groups of the left (Massachusetts Public Interest Research
Group) and the right (Citizens for Limited Taxation). On most major issues, power-
ful groups are likely to be opposed to one another, yet each of these groups has
some issues over which it is the dominant influence. A clearer picture will emerge
when we examine each type of group separately.
Business in Massachusetts Politics
Discussion of interest groups' resources usually covers votes, money, and informa-
tion.
11 Business, taken collectively, has an additional resource: without its coopera-
tion, the economy will cease to function. Labor, too, can bring the system to a halt
by striking, but a union strike is an extraordinary event. A corporation's decision
to move a Massachusetts plant to a new location is simply an everyday business
decision, what Charles Lindblom calls "the privileged position of business." 12 Polit-
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ical leaders must meet the needs of the business community regardless of their
lobbying effort. Since business leaders are also effective lobbyists, their power is
maximized.
The clearest example of this privileged position came in 1975-1976. With the state
facing a recession and a budget crisis, a group of large financial institutions, led by
the (then) First National Bank of Boston, declared that it would not buy any of sev-
eral forthcoming state debt offerings unless several conditions were met, some of
which were economic in the narrow sense. So-called moral obligation notes had to
be replaced by those backed with the full faith and credit of the state, short-term
notes with long-term bonds, and the new bonds were sold with above-market inter-
est rates. But other conditions were more political. In November of 1975 the banks
insisted that a "credible" state budget be passed before they would purchase $131
million in notes. The ensuing budget cut 8,000 cases from the general relief category
of welfare, reduced social service programs by $300 million, eliminated planned
cost-of-living increases for welfare clients and state workers, and raised taxes by
$350 million. 13
Legislators and aides were asked to list the groups in each of the seven categories
shown in Table 2 from which they heard most frequently. Table 4 gives the most fre-
quently named business groups, with other information about them as reported to
the Office of the Secretary of State for 1986. However, while some specific groups
do stand out— Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM), the Massachusetts
High Technology Council, and the Business Round Table in particular— other orga-
nizations tend to blend with the broader interest in respondents' perceptions. Thus
there were six mentions by name of the Massachusetts Hospital Association (MHA),
but five other citations of hospitals or the health care industry. This doesn't indicate
that the MHA is weak, but that it has chosen an effective lobbying strategy.
One state senator, dissatisfied with the survey form, added a written comment:
"Your survey fails to delineate the type of lobbying which is effective. If groups have
members who are my constituents who contact me— especially on a personal level
as opposed to petition or pre-printed letter— I listen. Otherwise 'groups' don't
influence me very much other than local groups." Because this statement could be
applied to many legislators, the MHA accordingly seeks to present its cause through
representatives of local hospitals, not just in its own name.
The group mentioned most often, AIM, is the umbrella group for Massachusetts
manufacturing. As such it concerns itself with the overall business climate; it seeks
to lower taxes, limit regulation, and counterbalance the influence of labor unions on
such issues as worker's compensation and plant-closing legislation. With eight paid
legislative agents, AIM is active and visible to legislators and their aides. However,
much business lobbying focuses on the specific concerns of such regulated industries
as health care, banking, insurance, and utilities. Groups representing each industry
are active when that industry's interests are at stake, so that the relative prominence
of any particular group is more an indication of what the legislature is doing that
year than of any group's inherent influence.
Professional groups, listed separately on the survey form, might better be consid-
ered a subset of business groups. Respondents mentioned doctors (the Massachusetts
Medical Society) and lawyers (the Massachusetts Bar Association) most prominently. 14
These groups are strongest when they are defending their professional jurisdiction
against incursions by nurses or paralegals. Recently, the two groups have also con-
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fronted each other over the issue of medical malpractice, with doctors seeking to limit
liability and lawyers upholding the sovereignty of juries. The result has been a lack of
state action, with the costs adding to health care inflation.
Table 4
Business Groups Most Often Heard From
Group
Number of Number of Number of Reported
Legislator Staff Paid Spending,









Life Insurance Association of
Massachusetts (LIAM)*
Small business T
*Chambers of Commerce include eight local Chamber of Commerce organizations; LIAM includes
mentions of insurance or insurance lobby.
' Most mentions were to generic small business; no one organization stood out, although several
received a mention.
Source: Calculated from my survey, November-December 1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of
























Legislators rated labor as the most powerful interest in the state, while aides placed
it in first position with business. Like business, labor possesses economic power to
back up its political efforts, but labor's economic power is harder to use, as in the
difference between everyday business decisions and the rare strike or other work
action by labor. Collective bargaining is an effective means of pursuing economic
goals, but with the important exception of public employees, for whom decisions
about wages and working conditions are simultaneously political and economic, it is
difficult to use collective bargaining for political ends. Hence unions in Massachusetts
have developed sizable lobbying operations. Groups classified as unions by the Sec-
retary of State reported spending $284,548 on lobbying activities in 1986. If we add
the Massachusetts Teachers Association which, though classified as an education
affairs and services group, holds numerous union contracts with local school com-
mittees, the total rises to $359,928. Police and firefighting unions lobby so inten-
sively that the Secretary of State gives them their own category; these groups
reported spending $178,996.
Lockard and Morehouse 15 both found that Massachusetts unions were closely tied
to the Democratic Party. Despite the neoliberal tendencies of former Democratic
Governor Michael Dukakis, which made him hesitant to identify too closely with
unions, this remained true in the 1980s. Given the Democratic dominance of the legis-
lature, unions have felt little need to seek Republican votes. However, the unions'
influence is limited by the equally significant power of business. Rather than wage
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intensive conflict for broad social change, labor in Massachusetts has generally chosen
to narrow its focus. In addition, some unions are more influential than others. As a
result of both these factors, much of labor's lobbying effort is devoted either to win-
ning approval for job-creating public works projects or to improvement of the pay and
working conditions of public employees. On the first, labor is as likely as not to find
itself allied with business. On the second, its power is limited by budgetary constraints
and opposed by antitax groups, but such opposition is normally subdued.
Table 5 shows the labor groups from which respondents reported hearing most
often. Except for the umbrella AFL-CIO, which leads the list, public employees'
unions dominate, with the AFL-CIO Building Trades Council the only other group
to receive significant mention. In recent years the AFL-CIO has pursued interests
ranging from the reform of workers' compensation to the defeat of a bottle-deposit
law. It has also worked to support the aims of the other unions listed in the table.
But despite internal pressure from its left wing, the AFL-CIO has not pursued a
broad working-class agenda. When it has done so, its efforts have met with only
limited success.
For example, in 1984 unions endorsed a bill sponsored by then state representa-
tive Thomas Gallagher, a Boston Democrat, to protect workers from plant closings.
Basic industry in Massachusetts has been declining, and several of the state's smaller
cities have seen the closing of factories that were the mainstay of the local economy.
Table 5
Labor Groups Most Often Heard From
Group
Number of Number of Number of Reported
Legislator Staff Paid Spending,






Massachusetts Federation of Teachers
MTA and MFT
Firefighters
Professional Firefighters of Massachusetts




AFL-CIO Building Trades Council
American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees
Service Employees International Union
















7 3 1 3,666
6 4 2 69,000
6 5 2 36,933
* Combined total for Boston Police Alliance, Boston Police Patrolman's Association, Massachusetts Police
Association, International Brotherhood of Police Officers/National Association of Government Employees, and
State Police Association of Massachusetts.
Source: Calculated from my survey, November-December 1987, and Massachusetts Secretary of State, Financial
Statistics for Lobbyists, 1986, and Legislative Agents and Employers; 1986; Disclosed Salaries— Cross Reference.
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This industrial decline was counterbalanced during the 1980s by the growth of jobs
in the service sector and in high-technology industry, so that the statewide unem-
ployment rate was low until the end of the decade. But even at the height of what
became known as the Massachusetts miracle, the new jobs either paid less than the
old ones or went to different people; hence members of the unskilled industrial
work force suffered, and locally depressed areas persisted even when the boom was
at its height.
Gallagher's bill would have required advance notice of layoffs on a graduated
scale, from one month for layoffs of 50 to 99 employees to one year for layoffs of
1,000 or more. Companies that failed to give notice would have had to offer sever-
ance pay to each employee in proportion to the notice not given. It would also have
helped community-based nonprofit organizations take over the operation of closed
plants. Although the bill was cosponsored by 81 of the 160 state representatives and
11 of the 40 senators, it was blocked by the insistence of the Massachusetts High
Technology Council that its members would refuse to expand their operations in
Massachusetts if the bill passed. Rather than choose sides, Governor Dukakis called
all parties together to try to effect a compromise. After protracted negotiations, a
much weakened version of the bill was enacted, which made advance notice volun-
tary and provided some funds for retraining workers. Despite intense dissatisfaction
with the law as passed, Gallagher and the unions ultimately supported it as the best
they could hope to get.
Since the 1980s the AFL-CIO has tried to increase its strength by involving its
rank-and-file members. Local activists have been urged to run as delegates to state
Democratic conventions. In 1983 the unions, which had not yet endorsed a presiden-
tial candidate for the 1984 election, demonstrated their strength by asking delegates
to write in the woid jobs for a presidential straw poll taken at the state convention.
"Jobs" came in second to Walter Mondale, with 25.6 percent of the vote. While this
reaffirmed labor's importance to the party, it is difficult to trace any specific policy
results to it.
16
Labor won a dramatic referendum victory in the 1988 general election. The Asso-
ciated Builders and Contractors (ABC), an interest group of builders who employ
nonunion workers, had placed repeal of the Massachusetts prevailing wage law on
the ballot by initiative petition. The ABC portrayed the law as helping only highly
paid construction workers while driving up the cost of local government. The unions
might have been vulnerable to these arguments, but they defined the issue success-
fully as one of broad class solidarity. Most of their campaign shunned debate on the
specifics for such broad slogans as "Question 2— Bad for You" and, on a suitably
illustrated billboard, "Listen to Mama— Vote No on 2." All members of the AFL-
CIO Building Trades Council in Massachusetts were assessed $50 for the campaign
fund, and thousands worked the polls on Election Day. Despite one serious gaffe,
when a worker who appeared in a television advertisement was found to have made
$70,000 in the previous year, the unions won by a landslide. The victory was defen-
sive, but the new level of rank-and-file mobilization obtained carries the possibility
of growing strength in the future. 17
As stated above, most labor lobbying is done by public employees' unions. This is
understandable; since their pay and working conditions are set by elected officials,
public employees are the most directly affected by political decisions. Unions repre-
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senting state employees seek to legislate pay raises and job security directly, while
those representing employees of local government seek state standards for salaries
and working conditions and state aid to help local government pay the bills. Unions
of teachers, police officers, and firefighters have been particularly effective in influ-
encing legislation. In return, they are able to deliver campaign contributions and the
votes of their members in the district. Normally the result has been a classic case
of what Theodore Lowi has called "interest group liberalism"; 18 public employees'
unions, which press strongly for particularized benefits, are opposed only by diffuse
taxpayer resistance, so they normally win. This has often been the case in Mas-
sachusetts, but not always, as we shall see.
Grassroots Lobbying
The civil rights and campus protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s spawned a
host of community organizations all across Massachusetts. Some were launched by
former campus activists seeking to broaden their base, others by local residents who
saw and admired the successes of groups elsewhere. All shared some relation to the
New Left tenet that all people have a right to participate in making those decisions
which affect their lives. These local groups developed a wide repertory of political
tactics, from civil disobedience to picketing officials' homes to mass attendance at
legislative hearings. While many such groups were unable to sustain grassroots
involvement and burned themselves out after a few years, a few have developed
funding mechanisms and membership structures that have enabled them to attain
permanence. The Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group, more commonly
known as MassPIRG, is a typical example.
MassPIRG is part of a national PIRG network, inspired by and still affiliated with
Ralph Nader. Nader's idea was that college students vote to have a per capita fee
added to their tuition bills, either as a portion of the student activities fee or as an
additional levy, and paid in a lump sum to a state PIRG, which would conduct
research and lobby in the public interest— at least as PIRG conceived it. The idea
caught on at several campuses, providing MassPIRG with a stable membership and
source of funds.
This official campus funding arrangement is unique to the state PIRGs. In addi-
tion, MassPIRG uses a technique it shares with a number of similar organizations,
the professional canvass. Full- and part-time canvassers, many of them students, are
hired on commission to go door to door, talking about PIRG's current campaigns
and asking for contributions. No canvasser is likely to grow rich under this arrange-
ment, but many young people find it rewarding to pick up some ready cash while
contributing to a cause they believe in. The canvass produces new dues-paying
members, occasional activists, and a steady source of funds to pay the expenses of
organizing, research, and lobbying.
MassPIRG has sought to represent the diffuse interests of citizens and con-
sumers, counteracting the tendency toward "interest-group liberalism" cited above.
Typical MassPIRG legislative goals have included mail-in voter registration, the
closing of nuclear power plants, more rigorous testing of drinking water, and
requiring developers to include child-care facilities in large commercial or indus-
trial properties. 19
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MassPIRG, together with a group of similar grassroots organizations, played a
central role in the development of the initiative petition as a lobbying tool. Article
48 of the amendments to the Massachusetts convention, which provides for the
right of initiative, was ratified in 1918 but had fallen into relative disuse by the early
1960s. However, the initiative has seen a revival in the last two decades. Early efforts
included unsuccessful attempts to regulate utility rates and enact a bottle-deposit
law, and a successful one to allow cities and towns to tax business property at a
higher rate than residential property. By the late 1970s, citizen-originated referenda
often dominated the otherwise uninteresting ballot in statewide elections.
Such groups as MassPIRG and Massachusetts Fair Share liked the initiative because
it not only gave them a chance to defeat better-financed interests, but also provided
the kind of organizing tactic they needed to maintain their mass membership base.
These advantages soon became apparent to another group that felt excluded from the
state's power structure, the far right. Following the well-publicized victory of the Jarvis-
Gann tax-cutting initiative, Proposition 13, in California, a group called Citizens for
Limited Taxation (CLT) launched an initiative drive to enact Proposition 2 lk. This
number did not refer to the measure's position on the referendum ballot (Question 2),
but to its central provision: with certain qualifications and modifications, no city or
town would be permitted to set its property tax rate at more than 2 xk percent of fair
market value.
CLT's action touched off a protracted battle. Proposition 2 lk threatened the vital
interests of public employees, who feared that it would deprive local government of
the money to pay them. If that wasn't enough, it also contained provisions repealing
all state mandates for spending by local school authorities and abolishing compul-
sory arbitration of labor disputes involving police and fire departments. These
provisions had been important past victories of the teachers and of the police and
firefighting unions, respectively. Advocates of improved welfare, health care, and
housing also opposed Proposition 2xlz\ while their programs were state funded, they
realized that the state would have to make up some of the local governments' fiscal
losses, leaving less for other state functions.
Local governments themselves opposed the referendum almost unanimously, as
did most other elected officials. On the other side, CLT received major support from
the Massachusetts High Technology Council, from real estate interests, and less visi-
bly from other business groups. Since the state's voters were to decide, both sides
had to go beyond the usual lobbying tactics. Media advertising, bumper stickers,
leafleting, and grassroots meetings burgeoned. But ultimately the chance to vote for
lower taxes proved irresistible to the electorate; Proposition 21k was enacted,
1,438,768 to 998,839, in the 1980 general election.
The initiative and referendum process leads to the enactment of a state statute.
Like any statute, Proposition 2 lk could have been amended or repealed by the legis-
lature. However, CLT and its charismatic leader, Barbara Anderson, were able to
combine grassroots pressure with lobbying to rule this out almost immediately. State
legislators and local elected officials, almost all ofwhom had opposed the referen-
dum beforehand, scrambled to get back in step with their constituents by announc-
ing that they had got the message and would try their best to make the new law
work. State aid to local government was increased, but not enough to make up for
the loss in local revenues; public employees were laid off and services cut back. The
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sense of crisis wore off after two or three years, but the unions had learned that
there were new limits on their influence, and both left and right had learned that the
initiative process can be used by either side.
Both MassPIRG and CLT remain active. In 1986, CLT employed two paid agents
and reported spending $26,612 on lobbying, while MassPIRG employed eight agents
and spent $42,950. CLT is still influential but no longer succeeds in presenting itself
as the voice of the tax revolt; it never managed to develop an organized mass base
from those who voted for Proposition 2% In the survey, it was mentioned twenty
times as one of the groups most commonly heard from, but only fifteen of those who
mentioned it considered CLT a grassroots citizens group; the other five listed it as a
business group.
CLT attempted to regain its earlier status with a second referendum in 1990,
this time calling for a cut in the state income tax rate. Although the proposal—
Question 3— was endorsed by William Weld, other Republican candidates, and
some Democrats, enough voters were not convinced that it made sense to cut taxes
in the face of a state budget deficit of half a billion dollars. The opposition used such
slogans as "It goes too far" and "I'm mad, but I'm not crazy" to separate voters' dis-
gust with and anger at bureaucratic waste from endorsement of this specific pro-
posal, which was defeated.
MassPIRG's condition has been more stable; while it never reached the height of
power once attained by CLT, it continues to enjoy mixed success as it tackles contro-
versial issues. Current MassPIRG interests include control and cleanup of toxic
wastes and incentives for the use of recyclable packaging.
Environmental protection organizations in Massachusetts comprise a hybrid cate-
gory. On some issues they resort to grassroots mobilization; this has been particu-
larly true of the long battle over nuclear power and the successful effort to pass a
bottle-deposit law. But much of the environmentalists' concern has been with pre-
serving open space and protecting the state's wetlands and coastline from destruc-
tive development. There has been grassroots involvement on these issues, too, but
the tactics have centered on education and persuasion of policymakers rather than
on mass mobilization and initiative petitions. These tactics have been fairly success-
ful; Massachusetts now has strong coastal zone management and wetlands protec-
tion laws. In part, this success may have come more easily because the protected
areas are in towns inhabited by the state's social elite. Success in cleaning up Boston
Harbor, where untreated sewage washes up on beaches used by the working class,
has been harder to come by.
The Catholic Church
In 1958 Duane Lockard declared that "a good deal of foolishness has been written
about the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Democratic party in
Massachusetts." 20 Much of this foolishness is still believed, yet survey legislators and
staff were nearly unanimous in rating religious groups as the least influential of the
groups included. The Catholic church does try to influence politics and legislation,
as do Protestant churches to a lesser extent. Twenty-two legislators mentioned the
Catholic church, and thirteen named the Massachusetts Council of Churches (MCC)
among the religious groups most commonly heard from. Eleven aides also mentioned
the Catholic church, the only group cited more than three times. 21 But only three
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respondents considered "religious groups" to have "a great deal" of influence on leg-
islation. Moreover, the Catholic church has not been very successful in battles over
policy. Its highest priorities have been restricting abortions, gaining state financial
support for parochial schools, reducing access to birth control information, and pre-
venting use of the death penalty. It has been successful only on the last issue, on
which it has been joined by the liberal groups that have opposed it on the first three.
However, the church has won more often in the legislature itself; its final defeats
have come in the courts, in the executive branch, or from the voters. Abortion policy
provides a good example. While the right of a pregnant woman to have an abortion
is protected by the U.S. Constitution and the federal courts, states are not required
to pay for abortions through the Medicaid program, and no federal matching funds
are provided to states that choose to pay for them. The Massachusetts legislature
voted in 1979 not to pay for abortions with state funds, either for Medicaid patients
or for state employees. This law was revoked by the state's Supreme Judicial Court,
which found it to be unconstitutionally discriminatory against women, and the state
resumed paying for abortions.
Antiabortion forces, including the Catholic church, then sought to amend the
state constitution. Amendments must be approved by two successive biennial leg-
islatures, which meet in joint session as Constitutional Conventions (ConCons)
for this purpose, and then submitted to the voters at the next general election.
Advocates of abortion rights were able to slow down but not halt passage of the
amendment by the ConCon. In 1986, a question on the ballot proposed amending
the constitution to "allow the legislature to prohibit or regulate abortions to the
extent permitted by the United States Constitution," except for "abortions
required to prevent the death of the mother." The ensuing referendum campaign
was hard fought but not particularly close; the proposed amendment was defeated
by a 42 percent to 58 percent margin. 22 It was a bad election for the Catholic
church as a second proposed amendment, to permit state aid to religious and
other private elementary and secondary schools, was defeated even more badly,
30 percent to 70 percent.
These events show that the Catholic church does not control Massachusetts,
but they do raise a question abut the survey results. Is the low influence reported
for religious groups inconsistent with the success of the Catholic church in the
legislature on these two issues? While the available evidence does not allow a
definitive answer, I do not believe that the legislators and aides were responding
dishonestly. Rather, many legislators are personally opposed to the right to abor-
tion. While many of them are Catholics and see their position as part of their
Catholic beliefs, they also see it as coming from within, from their own con-
science, rather than from without, from pressure by church leaders. While we
cannot tell what would happen in the unlikely event that the church were to
change its official position, members believe that they are not responding to
influence when they vote on abortion.
This interpretation is reinforced by the knowledge that the Catholic church as
an organization does not represent the views of its members. While the church has
made opposition to abortion rights the centerpiece of its political program, opinion
surveys have consistently shown that a majority of Catholic voters are on the other
side. This has been reflected in the church's inability to deliver votes. The antiabor-
tion amendment lost in every county in the state, but came closest in Berkshire
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County, one of the most Protestant. And when the archbishop of Boston called on
the faithful to vote against U.S. Congressmen Barney Frank and James Shannon in
1982, both won the election.
Women in Politics
In 1987 women made up 52.4 percent of the population of Massachusetts, but only
19 percent of the House of Representatives and 15 percent of the state Senate. There
are currently no women in the state's congressional delegation.23 Evelyn Murphy,
lieutenant governor from 1987 to 1990, was the first woman to hold statewide elected
office. While seeking to increase the number ofwomen in politics, feminists have also
sought to compensate for their underrepresentation through lobbying efforts.
Survey respondents ranked women's groups one step from the bottom in frequency
of contact and influence on legislation. They were ranked somewhat higher in influ-
ence on the respondent's own vote, but even here were only fourth. But while legisla-
tors of both genders concur in assigning women's groups less than average influence
on the outcome of legislation, these groups are more often heard from and given a
better reception by women legislators than by their male colleagues (Table 6).
No doubt the selective lobbying of the most receptive representatives is a necessity,
given the resource constraints faced by women's groups. Of the four women's orga-
nizations mentioned most frequently by respondents, only the National Organization
for Women (NOW) reported spending any money at all on lobbying— a total of
$6,093— with one paid agent. The League of Women Voters, Mass. Choice, and the
Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus each received at least ten mentions, but did
not register as lobbying organizations; presumably they rely on their members' volun-
teer efforts.24
Despite their shortage of money, women's groups have had some success. Mas-
sachusetts has ratified the Equal Rights Amendment and adopted a similar amend-
ment to its own constitution. The women's lobby has also won passage of a bill to
Table 6
Mean Ratings of Women's Groups by








Groups most often heard from
(on a scale of
1 = never to
5 = very frequently) 3.83 3.29
Influence on own vote 3.92 3.26
Influence on outcome of legislation
(on a scale of
1 = none to
5 = a great deal) 2.92 2.89
Source: Calculated from my survey, November-December 1987.
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change sentencing practices to make the laws against rape more enforceable and
various measures to improve the enforcement of child support orders. The feminist
movement has done much to increase awareness of the problems of battered women
and forced the removal or censure of some judges who have been notably insensitive
on this issue.
But women's groups have met with markedly less success on issues that require
spending money. Every year a broad coalition of women's groups, social service
agencies, and welfare advocates launches the latest round in the Up to Poverty cam-
paign, seeking to bring the income ofAFDC recipients up to the official poverty
level; but every year the shortfall between benefits and the poverty line increases.
The Up to Poverty coalition is unable to overcome the constraints imposed on the
budget by those who support other spending programs or oppose higher taxes.
Massachusetts Lobbyists
As interest groups grow more important, so do lobbyists. Lobbying is a growth
industry in Massachusetts. In 1984, registered lobbying groups reported spending
just under $5 million. By 1986, the total had reached $8.9 million, and final figures
for 1987 are expected to approach $10 million. 25
Lobbyists are composed of many types. Some are retired politicians, like former
Senate president Kevin Harrington, whose six-foot-six figure can often be seen
around the State House. Harrington reported lobbying income of $123,015 in 1986
and $199,336 in 1987 from sources including insurance interests, the Shell Oil Com-
pany, and the Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute. 26 Some are professional
lobbyists who have worked their way up through their skill and contacts. A good
example is William R. Delaney, a retired police officer who launched a lobbying
firm, Delaney Associates, in 1980. In 1987 the firm earned $593,288 from twenty-
one business clients. Delaney learned his skills as president of the Metropolitan
Police Patrolmen's Union in the early 1970s, then decided to go into business for
himself. 27 But Delaney's success has not been unmixed; early in 1988 he was indicted
for having failed to file state income tax returns for the years 1982-1984.28
Harrington and Delaney fit the traditional picture of the lobbyist who works for
well-heeled special interests. Old-style lobbyists, aware of the high centralization
of power in the Massachusetts General Court, cultivated personal relationships
with the House speaker, the Senate president, and a few other key legislators.
Much of their work was done over a drink at the Golden Dome pub across the
street from the State House, over lunch at Anthony's Pier 4 Restaurant on the
Boston waterfront, or during conversations in the private offices of the leaders.
Campaign contributions, along with occasional bribes, were a major source of
influence, but knowledgeable intermediaries were needed to direct the money to
the right place while avoiding scandal. Therefore the ideal lobbyists were either
former legislators or others who had built up networks of personal friendship with
legislators over the years.
Lobbying of this sort was effective, but limited to those who could afford it.
Since it was based on money, it was most useful for business interests. Labor unions
employed similar tactics and were successful at gaining limited objectives. Unions of
state employees seeking legislated pay increases and construction unions seeking
public works projects were particularly prominent in their use of lobbyists.
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During the 1970s and 1980s a new, more populist style of lobbying developed.
Judy Meredith is a good example. She began as a community activist, found that she
enjoyed lobbying, and decided to go professional. In 1986 she reported earnings of
$59,200 from such groups as the Council of Human Service Providers, the Coalition
to License Acupuncturists, and Greater Boston Legal Services; in 1987 she earned
$63,000, including $16,000 from the city of Boston. 29 Meredith and other lobbyists of
this type found that they could replace the power of money with the power of votes.
They put more of their energy into educating their own client groups' membership
about issues and legislative procedures and finding ways to let legislators know that
their constituents are watching how they vote. One such tactic is the lobby day, when
supporters of a cause from around the state gather at the State House to meet with
their representatives and senators.30
These new tactics have helped change the style of Massachusetts interest-group
politics. Today, even business-oriented lobbyists find that it helps to demonstrate
grassroots support for their cause, as with the Massachusetts Hospital Association
campaign described at the beginning of this article. Nevertheless, money is still
vastly important in lobbying, and more and more of it is funneled through political
action committees (PACs). Although 1987 was not an election year, the ten largest
PACs contributed $271,763 to members of the state legislature, a 64 percent increase
over their contributions in the previous nonelection year. 31 Each of the top ten PACs
represented an industry or a labor union, most with important legislative goals that
year, as shown in Table 7. 32
Table 7
Contributions and Legislative Goals of







Massachusetts Realtors Defeat land bank bill Success $56,361
Painters District Council #35 Retain prevailing wage law Success 42,865
Massachusetts Bankers State Fund Cut tax on banks Pending 32,750
Bay State Physicians Defeat universal health care Success 29,097








Defeat universal health care Success 17,940
Sheet Metal Workers #17 Retain prevailing wage law Success 17,250
Committee to Elect Responsible
Public Officials
Further utility interests Mixed 14,050
Service Employees International
Union 254
Further interests of public
employees
Mixed 12,500
Source: Adapted from Peter B. Sleeper, "PACs Spend Lavishly, Effectively," Boston Globe, January 31, 1988, 27.
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Interest groups are a big and growing business in Massachusetts. The number of regis-
tered lobbyists continues to rise, as do interest-group spending and campaign contribu-
tions. Until the 1990 election, Massachusetts seemed to be growing increasingly similar
to a traditional one-party state, with the Democrats holding a dominant electoral posi-
tion but little or no coherence on policy issues. As in the old one-party South, this
allowed interest groups to grow in importance as the organizing force in policymaking.
But Massachusetts differs from those one-party states in having strong labor
unions, environmental organizations, women's groups, and such grassroots groups
as MassPIRG. These interests are not strong enough, singly or collectively, to over-
come the economic weight and political power of the state's businesses, but they are
strong enough to prevent the development of the kind of single-interest business
dominance common in the Old South and West. Moreover, there are important divi-
sions within the business community; for example, the huge health care industry
depends on third-party payments, which are financed through taxes and premiums
assessed in part on other industries. Such divisions further act to prevent single-
interest dominance. The situation in Massachusetts might thus be better character-
ized as one of interest-centered conflict rather than interest-group dominance.
Recent events suggest that party competition may return. The Republican Party
made a significant comeback in the 1990 election, winning the governorship and the
treasurer's office and doubling the size of its state Senate bloc. Governor William
Weld is a Republican very much in the mold of John Volpe and Francis Sargent whose
victory would have done no more than theirs did to change the balance of party
strength; but the Republican legislative gains may have more lasting importance. The
Republican State Committee, which in the last few elections had run talented neo-
phytes for Congress (and seen them obliterated) while virtually ignoring the state leg-
islature, reversed its strategy; it made a strong effort to find legislative candidates, and
the party gained seats as a result. It also made a serious effort to shed its previous
antiabortion label; Weld, Cellucci, and several successful Republican legislative candi-
dates in 1990 took strong positions in favor of the right to reproductive choice.
If the Republicans can sustain their efforts for the next few elections, Mas-
sachusetts may come to have a real two-party system. 33 If this happens, it may lead
the Democratic Party to gain more policy coherence as well; some interest groups
may then find themselves forced into partisan coalitions. Labor unions, citizens'
groups of the left and right, and the Massachusetts High Technology Council already
show signs of partisan sympathy. However, environmentalist groups, women's
groups, and other business groups— particularly the life insurance and health care
interests, but also AIM— seem determined to work with members of both parties.
Unless the parties unify themselves much more strongly than they have to date,
these groups will probably succeed in remaining neutral. The next few years will
hold great interest for students of Massachusetts politics. £*
This article is based on research done for my chapter, "Citizen Power, Corporate Power: Interest
Groups in Massachusetts, " in Ronald Hrebenar and Clive Thomas, eds., Interest Groups in the
Northeastern States, forthcoming. Earlier versions were presented in 1989 at the New York State
Political Science Association and at the New England Political Science Association. I wish to
thank Hrebenar and Thomas; discussants Edmund Beard, Jerome Mileur, and Steward Shapiro;
as well as Frances Burke, Donald Levitan, Richard McDowell, Garrison Nelson, and David Pfeif-
ferfor their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The survey would have been impossible
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without the help ofJean Walsh and the student assistants of the Suffolk University Department of
Government. The staffof the Research Desk of Suffolk University's Sawyer Library gave invalu-
able help in obtaining documents.
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